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Today’s Presentation
• Illustrates some key strategic aspects of conducting 
effective concept design & design-to-cost trade studies
¾What concept design is & why it’s important
¾ Fidelity needed in concept design solution
¾ Techniques in designing mission level trade space 
¾ Challenges in determining credible design convergence  
¾ Recommended practices 
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Important Note
• Concept design may be conducted using variety of methods
¾ This presentation describes selected aspects of one method for 
conducting a concept design study 
Uses a space observatory example
¾Method best suited to immature mission concepts that advance state 
of the art or that have high design uncertainty
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What Concept Design is 
&
Why it’s Important
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Concept Design is Exploratory Process to 
Determine System Level Design Baseline 
• Conducted in pre-Phase A & Phase A of Project Life Cycle to 
provide “feasible” system design baseline for new concept 
• As much an investigation of requirements as of design
¾ Concurrent investigation of:
Concept of operations
Requirements
Design 
 Performance
 Technology development
 Verification approach
 Flight dynamics
Ground segment  (ground stations, mission & science ops centers)
 Launch interface
Cost 
 Schedule
Risks, etc. 
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NASA Project Life Cycle 
NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E
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Concept Design Plays Central Role in 
Project Success 
• Earliest life cycle phases have most leverage over life cycle cost 
(LCC)
¾ Concept design product effectively locks (or renders unchangeable) 
~70% of system LCC
 Per ref. (a) & ref. (b)
• Such extraordinary leverage presents business case for 
conducting concept design in pragmatic & rigorous fashion 
¾ Particularly important for immature mission concepts that advance 
state of the art or that have high design uncertainty
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Concept Design Plays Central Role in 
Project Success (Cont’d) 
• Done well, provides executable system level design baseline 
for project teams in Phase B & later phases 
• Not done well, can subject project teams in Phase B & later 
phases to system level redesign – in some cases, to multiple 
system level redesigns accompanied by: 
¾ Fluid technical baselines with ever-decreasing capabilities
¾ Cost overruns & recurring schedule delays
¾ Contract disputes & cancellations
¾ Challenges in retaining trained personnel
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Pre-Phase A / Phase A Offer Unique Venue 
for System Level Trades
• Teams small, agile, closely coordinated
¾ Typically operate absent many formalities of later project phases
 e.g., typically no prime contracts, system level requirements not under 
configuration control until late in phase A
¾ Can accommodate high rate of change in system level 
“requirements” & design characteristics (R&DC) 
 Enables broad investigation of trade space in relatively short time
• Note:
¾ “requirements” in quotes denotes interim reference capabilities used 
to guide evaluation of point designs in trade space
¾ System level requirements aren’t baselined until SRR for a final 
concept design that meets technical & programmatic (including cost 
& schedule) constraints 
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Phase B & Later Development Phases Not 
Well Suited for System Level Trades
• In Phase B, system level design is more difficult & expensive 
to change, e.g., 
¾ Teams typically larger & more distributed 
¾ Prime contracts typically in place
¾ System level requirements typically under configuration control 
¾ Preliminary design work assumes system level design complete
• In Phases C & D, system level changes even more difficult & 
expensive to change 
¾ Teams typically even larger than in Phase B
¾ System & subsystem level requirements typically under configuration 
control 
¾ Detailed design work either underway or has been completed
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Fidelity Needed in Concept Design 
Solution
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A Proposed Definition for “Feasible”
• The term “feasible” is used frequently in concept design, but 
its use is often problematic
¾Often left undefined & subject to interpretation
• This presentation uses “feasible” mission concept to mean:
¾ Technical, cost, & schedule characteristics for a single, baseline 
mission concept design have been credibly converged to the 1st 
order by the end of Phase A, 
¾ such that the design may be developed, launched, operated, & 
decommissioned by a competent project team starting in Phase B 
within customary technical & programmatic margins
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A Proposed Metric for Level of 
Convergence (1 of 2)
• Credible convergence to 1st order by end of Phase A means:
¾ System level sizing & performance (SLSP) of mission elements is 
confidently determined to within 90% of SLSP when flight system is 
delivered
 For given cost & schedule constraints
¾ i.e., there is residual uncertainty that SLSP could change by ± ~10% 
between end of Phase A & launch
13 
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A Proposed Model for Product Fidelity 
During Design Phases (Solid Black Curve)*
14 
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A Proposed Metric for Level of 
Convergence (2 of 2)
• Solid black curve in Fig. 2 (uniform convergence) shows 
allowable SLSP error decreases as design moves from 
Phases Pre-A through C
¾ End Phase A:  1st order, or 90%    (accurate to 1 digit,   ~ ± 10% error)*
¾ End Phase B:  2nd order, or 99%   (accurate to 2 digits, ~ ±    1% error)
¾ End Phase C:  3rd order, or 99.9% (accurate to 3 digits, ~ ± 0.1% error)
• Metrics for SLSP error are approximate guidelines only
¾ Coarse model that depicts an idealized trend of fidelity in each phase
¾ Assume calculations done properly, but with incomplete or incorrect 
information / assumptions
• * read  as 9 x 101 %, accurate to 1 significant digit
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Example SLSP Error Convergence for 
Mass
• For a 4,000 kg space observatory, system level mass should 
be known to:
 End Phase A:  Within ~ ± 10%, or ~ ± 400 kg of final launch mass
 End Phase B:  Within ~ ±    1%, or ~ ±   40 kg of final launch mass
 End Phase C:  Within ~ ± 0.1%, or ~ ±     4 kg of final launch mass
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Role of (Selected) Resource Margins on 
Required Convergence 
• Solid black curve in Fig. 2 must be within allowable margins
¾ Power & Dry Mass Margin requirements (per ref. (d)) are shown in 
Fig. 2
 (QG3KDVH$
 (QG3KDVH%
 (QG3KDVH&
• Cost (not shown in Fig. 2) serves as design constraint  
¾ Cost margin (per ref. (e)) 
&RVWWKURXJK3KDVH'JXLGHOLQHDW3KDVH%VWDUW
&RVWWKURXJK3KDVH'requirement at Phase C start)
• Other programmatic margin requirements apply as well, e.g., 
¾ Schedule margin (per ref. (e)), not shown in Fig. 2
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Importance of Concept Design 
Convergence to Project Manager
• Project Manager at start of Phase B holds 25% margins for 
power & dry mass resources (Fig. 2)
¾ Can accommodate concept design credibly converged to within 10% 
of flight sizing & performance values for power & dry mass
 Even if 10% error occurs in direction of needing more resources
¾ Can’t accommodate concept design credibly converged to within 
30% of flight sizing & performance values for power & dry mass
 if 30% error occurs in direction of needing more resources
Design de-scope likely required
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Techniques in Designing Mission Level 
Trade Space
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Concept Design Mission Level Trade Space
Selecting Trades to Expedite Convergence – 3 Cycle Example
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Figure 3 
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Concept Design Mission Level Trade Space 
Selecting Trades to Expedite Convergence – 3 Cycle Example 
(Cont’d)
• Approach in Fig. 3 deduces R&DC for C design by interpola-
ting on results from A & B designs (bounding cases) 
¾ Technical capability of point C isn’t known at outset of study
• More like root finding algorithm than like successive 
refinement design process typically used in Phases B & C  
¾ In Phases B & C, each design is refinement of “baseline” system 
level design from prior phase
¾ In concept design process discussed here, typically there isn’t a 
“baseline” system level design until concept design is complete
• Purposely views design problem from multiple perspectives
¾ Illuminates aspects that otherwise may have remained hidden
Helps stimulate creative thinking & mitigate biases
Helps discover “unknown unknowns” (UUs)
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Why Selecting Bounding Cases is 
Important
• Failure to select bounding cases may cause extrapolation to 
determine R&DC for final solution
¾ Adds risk in technical, cost, & schedule estimates
¾May result if both A & B designs exceed cost & schedule constraints
 Implies R&DC for B design didn’t identify “true” science or technology floor 
(presumes a solution exists)
• Or, may cause need for more design cycles 
¾ Deadline may not permit, or may drive significant team overtime 
• Optimistic A designs & “false” science floors for B designs 
are common
¾ Customer’s vision often isn’t cost / schedule constrained
¾ Customer may resist identifying “true” science or technology floor 
• Teams that recognize, or adapt to, these considerations  
pragmatically & quickly fare better than teams that don’t
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Selecting R&DC (Typical Case)
• Typical Approach
¾ A Design:  Most* parameters reflect realistic desired capability
¾ B Design:  Most* parameters reflect science or technology floor
¾ C Design:  Most* parameters are between A & B capabilities
         * but not necessarily all
• R&DC for B design reevaluated after A design to assure 
solution space bounded 
¾ Presumes A design done first
• Many parameters varied concurrently due to need to cover 
broad solution space in limited time** 
¾ Experience shows teams can sufficiently understand parameter 
sensitivities
       ** after approach originally used by Mr. John Oberright, NASA / GSFC  Emeritus, for
    Space Technology-5 concept design study (1999)
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Challenges in Determining Credible 
Design Convergence 
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• Concept design is inherently an exploratory process with 
relatively high uncertainty
• Concept design teams learn at high rate
¾ Early assumptions & conclusions may be invalidated by later findings 
or by unpredictable discovery of UUs 
Convergence  can appear non-uniform (see copper line in Fig. 2)
• Yet, indicators are desired to help avoid inferring 
convergence prematurely, e.g., due to:
¾ Insufficient rigor
¾ Study funds or time being exhausted
¾ Pressure to meet a milestone deliverable, etc.
¾ Biases
25 
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Convergence Determinations Often 
Evident Only in Hindsight  
26 
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Why Early Cost Estimates Tend to be  
Optimistic 
• A common characteristic of concept design is costs for a 
given design tend to increase with each design cycle
¾ Particularly true for immature mission concepts that advance state of 
the art or that have high design uncertainty
• As teams progress through cycles, they learn more of what 
may have been omitted / incorrectly assumed in prior cycles 
¾ After B cycle, cost of A design may increase
¾ After C cycle, cost of A design may increase again, & cost of B 
design may increase
Causes A & B points to move to right in Fig. 4
¾When accompanied by schedule increases, A & B points also move 
into page
¾ After C cycle, learning tapers off for most designs 
Occasionally, a D cycle is needed (or may be planned from outset)
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Why Early Cost Estimates Tend to be  
Optimistic (Cont’d)
• Cost analysis is normally performed using multiple methods
¾One method is “grass roots” - uses relatively detailed work 
breakdown structure (WBS)
• WBS dictionary for most space mission elements is 
relatively well known & largely existing, e.g., 
¾ Spacecraft, launch, ground systems, etc.
• Conversely, WBS dictionary for new instruments is unique 
¾ Design dependent, evolves as instrument design evolves 
¾ Key aspect for designs dominated by new instruments
• Multiple cost cycles typically needed to develop well 
understood WBS free of significant gaps & overlaps
¾ Cost fidelity improves with understanding of design and WBS
¾Gaps common in design & cost in early cycles as team learns
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Subjective Criterion for Convergence 
Determination – Significant Surprises
• One subjective criterion for credible convergence is whether 
team has experienced significant surprises
• Team that hasn’t experienced at least a few significant 
surprises should be cautious of its results
• Lack of surprises may indicate:
¾ Team hasn’t progressed sufficiently down learning curve 
¾ Team didn’t sufficiently exercise trade space or mitigate biases
¾ Concept design study objective wasn’t sufficiently challenging
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Recommended Practices
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General Guidance
• Treat design cycles as precious resource 
¾ Essential, but in limited supply due to time & resources available 
• Don’t retrofit A & B designs with insights from later cycles
¾ Time better spent just applying learning to final design
• Document design results in reports (not briefings) at end of 
each cycle (see rationale in backup charts)
¾ Reports (functional, not pristine) are record documents 
¾ Briefings, if needed, are built exclusively from approved reports 
• Focus on what “should” be done vs. what “can” be done
¾ Address 1st order items that demand attention early
Defer lower order items to later phases
¾ Focus team efforts on developing product, omit peripheral tasks 
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Analogy for 1st Order Level of Analysis 
Depth in Concept Design 
• Pre-Phase A & Phase A teams evaluate multiple designs in 
broad trade space in relatively short period
¾ Analysis tools used typically are 1st order precision, agile enough to 
adapt to frequent  / significant system level changes
 Analogy:  “Hacksaw”
• By comparison, analysis tools typically used in:
¾ Phase B are 2nd order precision, assume system level design stable 
 Analogy:  “File”
¾ Phase C are 3rd order precision, assume both system & subsystem 
level designs stable 
 Analogy:  “Polisher”
32 
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Analogy for 1st Order Level of Analysis 
Depth in Concept Design (Cont’d)
• Team using “hacksaw” in Phase C has done something 
wrong
¾ Didn’t credibly converge 1st order solution by end of Phase A
¾ Re-doing concept design work late & out of sequence
• Team using “polisher” in Phase A is doing something wrong
¾Won’t move quickly or broadly enough to rough-out & credibly 
converge 1st order solution*
Recognize some design elements may not even exist in final concept 
design
* Some high risk elements may selectively warrant added scrutiny
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Avoid Significant Rounding Errors
• To avoid masking resource margins, bookkeep design & 
performance calculations to 3 significant digits & report out 
to 2 significant digits 
¾ Should not be taken to imply there is 3-digit accuracy in concept 
design work -- there usually is not
¾ Simply a numerical safeguard to avoid propagating rounding errors 
that could overwhelm ability to adequately determine design or 
performance margins
¾ See margin example in backup charts
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Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases 
of Concept Design
• Concept design teams developing immature mission 
concepts that advance state of the art often experience four 
phases of work
¾ 1) Unbridled Optimism 
¾ 2) Shock
¾ 3) Denial
¾ 4) Acceptance
• The quicker a team moves through phases 1,2, & 3 and 
arrives at Phase 4, the better that team will fare
¾ See backup charts for additional discussion
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Closing Thoughts
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Closing Thoughts (1 of 2)
• Concept design phases have extraordinary leverage over  
project success, it’s important they be:
¾ Conducted in rigorous & pragmatic fashion
 Particularly for immature mission concepts that advance state of the art or 
that have high design uncertainty
¾ Credibly converged to 1st order prior to Phase B 
 Project Manager relies upon this 
• Unknowns dominate for designs that advance state of art
¾ Be cautious of early results, they may not be as initially appear
¾ Use bounding trades to help discover major UUs & mitigate biases
¾ Look for evidence of significant surprises / unexpected findings
 Indicate team progressing down learning curve, results becoming more 
credible
¾ Don’t let first cost estimate be final cost estimate
37 
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Closing Thoughts (2 of 2)
• Concept design phases provide unique venue to facilitate 
exploring & converging system level design
¾ Use the opportunity in these phases well
¾ Not used well, the work of these phases usually will have to be re-
done
 The later this realization occurs, the more expensive the resulting 
redesign is likely to be
38 
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Backup
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Documenting Concept Design Results 
in Reports at End of Each Design Cycle
• Provides official study record of what team did, how team 
did it, & what team found for present (& future) team use
• Reports are developed for each subsystem / discipline
¾ Built from standardized templates
 Include analysis methods & example calculations
¾ Provide coherent technical waypoints that enable team to recall 
designs & performance from prior cycles, often needed for scaling or 
comparison 
High rate of design changes  makes recollection difficult otherwise
¾ Used for system level review, subsystem integration, independent 
review, new / follow-on team member orientation
• Once approved, reports typically are under informal 
configuration control of Mission Systems Engineer
¾ Briefings can be generated quickly from approved reports
¾ Briefings contain only information in approved reports
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Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin 
Determination
• Rounding errors can significantly affect margin 
determination if adequate care isn’t exercised 
¾ In some cases, rounding errors can fully mask margins such as those 
for mass & power shown in Fig. 2
42 
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Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin 
Determination (Cont’d)
Example
Case 1:  Power Available = 200 W
Max. Estimated Power Required = 249 W
Power Margin =   100 (200 W – 249 W) / 249 W   =  -19.7%
Case 2:   Power Available = 200 W
Max. Estimated Power Required = 151 W
Power Margin =   100 (200 W – 151 W) / 151 W  =  32.5%
The margins for Cases 1 and 2 are -19.7% and +32.5%, respectively 
Now consider a third case in which a designer rounds calculations to the first 
digit in Cases 1 and 2
Case 3:   Power Available = 2 x 102 W
Max. Estimated Power Required = 2 x 102 W  
Power Margin =   100 (2 x 102 W – 2 x 102 W) / 2 x 102 W  =      0%
The margin for Case 3 is 0%
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Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin 
Determination (Cont’d)
Example
• Required power margin at end of pre-Phase A is 30% (Fig. 2) 
¾ Comparing Case 3 to Case 2 shows how rounding to 1st digit can  
fully mask a margin of over 30%  
¾ Additional errors can accrue when combinations of rounded results 
are used in successive calculations
• To avoid masking resource margins, bookkeep design & 
performance calculations to 3 significant digits & report out 
to 2 significant digits 
• Notes:  
¾ This should not be taken to imply there is 3-digit accuracy in concept 
design work -- there usually is not
¾ This practice is simply a numerical safeguard to avoid propagating 
rounding errors that could overwhelm ability to adequately determine 
design or performance margins
¾Margin calculation method is per ref. (d), Table 1.06
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Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases 
of Concept Design
• Concept design teams developing new designs that advance  
state of the art often experience four phases of work 
• 1) Unbridled Optimism
¾ This phase features unbridled, optimistic performance desires levied 
as “requirements” before team gains credible understanding of 
associated cost & schedule
¾Meetings often not well-focused on study objectives
Often feature unproductive, run-on advocacy discussions of why mission 
has best science of all competing missions & why it has best chance to 
win
• 2) Shock
¾ This brief phase usually begins after team completes its first credible 
cost estimate
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Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases 
of Concept Design (Cont’d) 
• 3) Denial  
¾ This phase features abundant rationalizations as to why models used 
to estimate costs weren’t representative
¾ Team points to anything but excessively high technical capability as 
reason costs are too high in order that science return remains 
compelling relative to competition
 Seeks to reduce costs in areas other than technical capability / science 
return below normal allocations
 Theorizes why partner no-cost contributions will be higher than initially 
planned 
 Argues why the request for proposal is incorrect, etc. 
• 4) Acceptance 
¾ This phase features the ultimate realization technical capability / 
science return must be lowered to design a credible mission concept 
One that meets cost & schedule constraints according to established 
independent review standards
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